|
Aleš Vaupotič
Philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin:
The concept of dialogism and mystical thought[1]
The works of Mikhail Bakhtin are above
all focused on the problems concerning literature and
therefore tend to belong to the field of literary criticism.
But at the same time we have to understand that this
particular approach to literature is methodologically a
so-called philosophical method or aspect,[2] which means
that it uses theoretical constructs that are external to the
literary phenomena. On the other hand, these concepts enable
us to approach the literary works from a previously
inaccessible point of view. Our text will show a complex
philosophical background that is in literary criticism
usually avoided, although this exact literary criticism at
the same time uses Bakhtin’s highly complex and also
problematic concepts. It is also important that in our
explication of the philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin we’ll
emphasize its fundamental dilemmas and suggest some
solutions from the point of view of religious philosophy. In
this essay we’ll show that in the very core of dialogism
(which is Bakhtin’s most important concept), there is a
mystical attempt at thinking something that transcends
subject[3]–object relations.
SIGN, IDEOLOGY, LANGUAGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS
Language is central to most of Bakhtin’s
works. In his book (published under the name of V. N.
Voloshinov) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language Bakhtin
proceeds from basic dualism: on one hand there are natural
phenomena, objects of technique and consumer articles, on
the other there is a world of signs. He uses two terms:
“sign” and “ideology”, which basically mean the same thing –
the ideology is more complex.[4] In this text, being
explicitly Marxist, Bakhtin takes into account the existence
itself before any ideology, but because of the radicalism of
the concept of the ideologic-semiotic this layer of reality
shrinks almost to nothing. (“The language, a word, it is
almost everything in the human life.”[5]) What comes forth
is the realm of the ideologic. A sign is something material,
a particular material thing, but on the other hand it also
carries meaning (thereby overcoming its individuality),
which is undividable from its material. Apart from the
material substance there is no meaning. It is neither
something psychological neither something ideal. Bakhtin’s
thought is materialistically monistic.[6] There are three
different notions: a sign, a thing and a meaning
(znachenie). The meaning is the function of a sign, the
relation between the reality of a sign and represented
reality.[7]
“The sign doesn’t exist merely as a part
of reality, it reflects and diffracts the reality […] To
each sign one could apply the criteria of ideological value
(a lie, truth, correctness, justice, good etc.)”[8] We
stress that the sign doesn’t simply reflect the reality, but
twists it, diffracts it. It is also important that the
diffraction is actually double: first the base diffracts in
the complex system of the superstructure, but particularly
important is the second diffraction - of an ideology in
contact with other ideologies.[9]
A word is privileged amongst signs. “A
word is ideological material par excellence. All the reality
of a word is dissolved in its semiotic function.”[10]
Further, a word is “a neutral sign”, because it belongs to
all the areas of ideological production. Thirdly: it is the
most important material of “the communication of life” – the
totality of experiences and their outward expressions, a
chaotic and ongoing semiotic flow, Marxist “social
psychology”. On one end it is connected to the economic base
and on the other to fully developed ideologies. Next: a word
is (semiotic) material of the consciousness, the inner life.
And for the fifth time: all ideological production is
surrounded with words, every ideological diffraction of a
being in the process of becoming – in any material – is
accompanied with the diffraction in words.
One of the main themes of the monograph
is the account of the human consciousness as an ideology.
Bakhtin is critical towards idealists and claims that every
experience is given – also to the one experiencing – in the
materiality of the semiotic. Therefore we have “external
signs” (social burgeoning of speech acts and more or less
complex ideologies) and “inner signs”, the consciousness.
The ideological sign is the common field of psyche and
ideology; it is a field of materiality, sociality and
meaning. A consciousness exists only while being fulfilled
with the semiotic-ideologic content, which is determined by
the process of social interaction, the great dialogue. The
semiotic-ideologic is a social feature and so it is also the
individuality of psyche as a diffraction of the external
signs in the internal ones.
If we consider the same question from
the other end (and in terms of other texts) one would ask,
how does Bakhtin understand the language? We have seen that
a human as “subject” is actually language. All human “acts”
(pustupok), all gestures, … are for Bakhtin “utterances”
(vyskazyvanie). This is the central notion of Bakhtin’s
philosophy of language. An utterance is an act, a social
event of discursive relations (in its broadest sense).
“Weltanschauung, a point of view, an opinion are always
expressed in words.”[11] Or: “A human act is a potential
text and can be understood (as human act, not physical
functioning) only in the dialogic context of its time (as a
replica, a meaningful position, a system of motives).”[12]
Human as subject is “a voice” that confronts other voices.
Bakhtin borrowed the concept of language as Weltanschauung
(with important changes, of course) from Wilhelm von
Humboldt. For Bakhtin the language is the totality of world,
the culture, … and could not in any case be construed as
something that is added to the alleged actual reality.
Ideological diffraction is the most
important theme of Bakhtin’s works (in different
terminological expressions). On one hand we have the world
of signs (and the sign itself) as the arena of the class
struggle and on the other the quiet diffraction of the
socially accomplished ideologies in the inner discourse, the
consciousness. A living ideological sign has many accents,
which originate in social multiplicity of accents, where the
sign finds itself on the battlefield of the class
ideologies. Bakhtin mentions “inner dialectics of the sign”.
This comes from the Marxist “authorial disguise”, as some
scholars (Aleksander Skaza) explain the heterogeneous
(usually Marxist) elements in Bakhtin’s theories. (Let’s add
that we refuse the associations of Bakhtin with Marxist
thought.) In Bakhtin’s essay The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences we read of
particularities of the dialogic relationships that could not
be reduced to “pure logic (dialectic) relations”.[13] The
scholars comment that the dialectics represent the
monological stage of dialogism.[14] On the other hand the
notion of dialectics usually replaces the term dialogism in
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. But we can
nevertheless find the “dialogism” in the key sentence:
“Every understanding is dialogic.”[15]
Bakhtin’s philosophy of language is
central to his philosophy and, of course, to his works on
literature. In its core there is a division between two
ways, how to analyse language (and also more or less
everything else). Let us illustrate this opposition with
some examples (from Marxism and the Philosophy of Language,
The Problem of Speech Genres, The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences and Toward a
Methodology for the Human Sciences).
|
linguistics, philology, structuralism
|
Marxist philosophy of language,[16]
metalinguistics[17]
|
|
grammar
|
stylistics
|
|
language (as system)
dead languages
|
speech communication
social discursive interaction
|
|
grammatical (syntactic) forms
|
speech genres
|
|
sentence,
word (less than an utterance)
|
utterance
word (as utterance)
|
|
text (only linguistic material)[18]
|
text (as utterance)[19]
|
|
monologic
|
dialogic
|
|
poetry, drama, epos
|
novel, prose fiction
|
In different periods Bakhtin used
different terms. We could easily add more and more binary
oppositions to this table, but this method probably would
not gain us any usable results. Let me just emphasize the
heterogeneity of the oppositions and particularly the use of
the notion “text” that designates two different meanings
(within a single essay[20]).
Bakhtin criticises the first column
(linguistics in line with Ferdinand de Saussure and
structuralism in general) in favour of the second one. The
linguistic-structuralistic approach is acceptable only
heuristically as a scientific abstraction that has to be
detached from the metalinguistic approach to the reality of
the language as actual discourse in the living
communication. Structuralism with its search for the logical
structures might be useful methodological model for the
natural sciences, but it cannot be applied to the study of
language as an interpersonal event - which could not be
reduced to human tool - or for humanities in general.
The basic notion in Bakhtin’s theories
is “an utterance”. It is determined by four
characteristics:[21] interchange of speaking subjects,
consummation (it has to be thematically accomplished through
the speakers intention), expressiveness (speaker’s
subjective emotional-axiological relation towards the object
and meaning of the content of the utterance) and, finally,
the utterance has to be addressed to somebody (a particular
addressee is being taken in consideration). An utterance is
a unit of the speech communication. It is always concrete,
undetectable from its context of culture (science, arts,
politics etc.) and from the context of a particular
individual personal situation of the living speaker. There
are no neutral utterances. Next, a larger whole is speech
communication as never ending exchange of utterances
structured as dialogue. Important terms are also “discourse”
as the whole of texts and “language” as system.[22]
DIALOGUE AND DIALOGISM
The name Mikhail Bakhtin is famous due
to the concepts of dialogue and dialogism. Dialogue is
primarily the basic model of language as discursive
communication. A sequence of utterances is a dialogue of
speaking subjects or voices that respond to former
utterances and anticipate the future ones. On the other hand
the dialogue doesn’t determine the utterance only
externally, but reaches also inside. There are three factors
determining an utterance. First, there is the content with
its objects and meaning (a theme being objective factor and
an authorial concept a subjective factor). The second factor
– constitutive for an utterance – is the expressiveness, the
emotional-axiological relation of the speaker towards the
content that could never be neutral – while, of course,
always being appropriated form other socially specific
utterances. Bakhtin speaks mainly of the intonation and
accent. On one hand, there is the expressiveness of an
utterance as a function of an individual author that
struggles with alien expressions on the same subject;
therefore we could speak of a micro-dialogue within a single
word (as an utterance). But on the other hand, we have to
consider the typical expressions and intonations connected
to particular types or groups of utterances (speech genres),
which make them social, not individual. It is apparent that
the utterance is dialogic, i.e. it is actually a dialogue of
different voices confronting one another. It is not
important whether an utterance is monologic or polyphonic -
it is fundamentally dialogic. An utterance is a point of
view, a Weltanschauung, that doesn’t come out of nothing,
but is always a response to other utterances by reusing
them. The third factor determining an utterance concerns the
relationship of the speaker with the other and his
utterances, the existing and the anticipated ones. An
utterance transgresses its borders into past linguistic
(semiotic, ideologic) formulations as their understanding,
but also into the future ones by speaking to them; it tries
to anticipate them – in a particular form and considering a
particular addressee (who is not just an empty form of the
structuralist ideal reader). An utterance always attempts to
reject the objections already while still anticipating them.
The dialogical “context” of an utterance (always an
ideology, but not necessarily verbal discourse)[23]
transgresses its boundaries (the interchange of speakers)
both towards the inside and outside.
To understand an utterance, being itself
an understanding answer, it requires at least two speaking
subjects. But the Bakhtinian concept of dialogue requires
three of them. We find more then one formulation.
Author (the speaker) has the
unalienable right to his word, but the rights belong
also to the listener and those, whose voices sound in
the word that the author previously found (after all,
there are no nobody’s words). A word is a drama that
features three persons (it is not a duet but trio). It
happens outside the author […][24]
In this case we have the voices of the
past speakers, the present author and future voices that
will form contexts for understanding. But there is another
trio - a more interesting one - concerning the dialogical
nature of understanding. The understanding (and also the
existence of language and consciousness in general) always
requires two subjects.
To see something for the first time,
to comprehend for the first time, it means to establish
a relationship: it doesn’t exist for itself but for the
other (two consciousnesses in mutual relationship). […]
(the understanding is never a tautology or repetition,
because there are always two and a potential third).[25]
To demonstrate more specifically the
place of the third we have to consider Bakhtin’s theory of
dialogic relationships. They exist only among whole
utterances – really or at least potentially whole ones –
behind which one can find (or within which are represented)
real or potential speaking subjects.[26] (Dialogic
relationships are impossible between linguistic unities.)
These utterances may be strictly monologic discursive
products. Dialogic relationships exist both between
temporally distant utterances that never establish actual
contacts, but when confronted on the level of meaning they
establish dialogic relationships, if there is at least some
proximity of meanings; and one can also find dialogic
relationships - or so called “zero” dialogic relationships -
where there is actual dialogic contact, but there’s no
contact of meaning – Bakhtin mentions comical situation of
the dialogue between mutes. “Here the point of view of the
third is made apparent (the one, that doesn’t participate in
the dialogue, but understands it).” For Bakhtin the third in
the dialogue is the understanding itself as its possibility.
Let us look at the key sentences.
The understanding itself as dialogic
element enters the dialogic system and somehow changes
its total sense. The one that understands inevitably
becomes “the third” in the dialogue (of course not in a
literal or arithmetic sense, because the number of
participants in the dialogue that is understood can be
unlimited, besides “the third”); however, the dialogic
position of the “third” is a very particular position.
Every utterance has always its addressee (of different
characters, different levels of proximity, specificity,
awareness etc.), whose responsive understanding is
searched for and anticipated by the author of discursive
product. This is “the second” (again not in arithmetic
sense). But the author presupposes besides this
addressee (“the second”) more or less consciously the
supreme “super-addressee” (“the third”), whose
absolutely righteous responsive act is foreseen either
in the metaphysical distance or in distant historic time
(addressee as “side or last exit” for the thought and
word of the addresser). In the different ages and within
different understanding of the world this
super-addressee and his ideal, actually responsive
understanding gets different ideological expressions
(god/God, absolute truth, the court of impartial human
consciousness, people, the court of history, science
etc.).[27]
Because it is impossible to think of the
relationships between the utterances from a point external
to the field of utterances, i.e. from a transcendental
position, Bakhtin places the possibility of understanding
into the dialogue itself as possibility of its infinite
continuation towards the perfect understanding. Let us add
that it could establish a religious element of Bakhtin’s
thought, but this is not as simple as that.
The third party that we mentioned
does not appear as something mystical or metaphysical
(even though it might, in particular understanding of
the world, acquire similar expression); “the third” is
component part of an utterance as a whole, which can be
revealed in it through in-depth analysis.[28]
Bakhtin is mentioning something similar
in his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics with the concept of
the “word with a loophole”, emphasizing the need to reserve
a “way out” for the word (and consciousness). Despite
apparent finality of the word there is always a way out that
prevents its dogmatisation.[29] Bakhtin uses the expression
“lazejka” – a narrow hole, exit (from an awkward situation),
a trick etc. The most famous instance of this feature is the
hero from Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground.[30] Let’s
mention another segment:
»To be heard” is itself a dialogic
relationship. The word wants to be heard, understood, it
wants to be an answer and again to reply a question and
so on ad infinitum.[31]
Let's add that the basic form of
dialogic relationship is also agreement.
There is neither a first nor a last
word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it
extends into boundless past and boundless future). Even
past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of
past centuries, can never be stabile (finalized, ended
once and for all) – they will always change (be renewed)
in the process of subsequent, future development of the
dialogue. […] There’s nothing absolutely dead: every
meaning will have its homecoming festival.[32]
From what has been said, we can conclude
that every utterance – or a word, which can be compared to
an utterance as a whole[33] – is an active element in an
endless dialogue and, as such, a complex web of voices. The
dialogism determines words intrinsically and their
relationships to other words. Linguistic concepts, such as
grammar, could never reach real relationships in a language.
These are only heuristic tools useful for the analysis of
dead (Classical) languages (where they were also developed)
and for synchronic aspects of language. The diachronic
aspect of language as dialogue of personalities (for example
heroes as ideologists in the polyphonic novel) is from the
linguistical point of view nonexistent. Thus we stumble upon
a new problem, how to study language in its generic aspect.
Bakhtin supplies his own answer – metalinguistics and the
speech genres.
METALINGUISTICS AND SPEECH GENRES
[…] linguistic mind as monologic mind
should be overcome by means of dialogic one, the
metalinguistic mind […][34]
The term metalinguistics existed before
Bakhtin and meant the study of relations between language
and society or culture. Radovan Matjašević links this term
to macrolinguistics, which for Bakhtin is still linguistics,
of course.[35] Contrary to linguistics his metalinguistics
studies non-systematic aspect of language therefore being
outside the field of exact sciences. The foundational scheme
of a metalinguistic relation is dialogism. Bakhtin’s
metalinguistics as philosophy of language is “the
metalanguage of all the sciences (and all the aspects of
cognition and consciousness)”.[36] (The notion was actually
first used in the essay The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences around
1960.[37]) Metalinguistics attempts to, on one hand, reject
the monolithic system of structuralisms, but on the other
hand, it still attempts to find repeating features of
reality (as speech communication) and relations among them
while being a part of the great dialogue as an instable
structure. (Scholars emphasize the similarities between
Bakhtin’s thought and poststructuralisms.)[38]
It is expected for a theory to try to
find different types of its basic elements, in this case the
basic element being an utterance it is not surprising that
Bakhtin attempts to discover more or less stabile types of
utterances. He names them speech genres; also (ideological
or life-) genres. They are first mentioned in Marxism and
the Philosophy of Language. »Every particular utterance is,
of course, individual [according to Saussure], but every
sphere of use of language produces its relatively steady
types of utterances, which we call speech genres.”[39]
Speech genre[40] is a unity of theme, style and
compositional principles of a group of individual
utterances. They are closely linked with particular areas of
communication. It is important to mention constant
expressions (being typical relationships of speakers towards
the content of an utterance). Bakhtin speaks of typical
addressees (e.g. conventional addressees in the history of
literature) and all the factors of an utterance that we
already mentioned.
Utterances and their types are
transmitting belts that connect the history of society
with history of language. It is impossible for a new
phenomenon (phonetic, lexical, grammatical) to enter the
system of language without passing a long and complex
way of generic and stylistic testing and
transformation.[41]
To be clear, the notion speech genre
covers everything from a single word utterance (or a mere
gesture) from everyday life to a novel in many volumes. The
criterion is unambiguously the interchange of speakers.
Bakhtin defines two types of speech genres – the simple or
primary ones and secondary or composite speech genres, that
are composed of primary ones. Every utterance relates to
reality and the other utterances in the speech communication
only as a whole. Consequently, a replica in a dialogue in a
novel is a part of ideological reality only as a segment of
a secondary genre. Here we encounter a problem, what are the
relations between particular primary utterances within a
secondary one and what are the relations between primary and
secondary utterances. The problem gets even more complex
concerning a somehow vague distinction between primary and
secondary types of utterances. The primary ones emerge in
everyday communication. The secondary ones are composite. It
is possible that Bakhtin’s distinction between the two types
of utterances actually emphasizes the mediated relationship
between reality and individual parts (primary utterances) of
secondary utterances. What is stressed is the interaction of
different genres that inhibits the vulgar understanding of
literature as mechanical representation of the world. The
hero doesn’t speak the words of the author - his words are
diffracted in the totality of the secondary speech genre, in
the authorial intention as formative principle of the
utterance (a novel). The author is always outside the work
of art that belongs to him only as a whole. In the novel all
primary utterances are more or less reified (objectified).
This explanation doesn’t work the other way around – the
concept of primary speech genre remains confused since it
seams clearly possible that the primary utterances can grow
out of secondary ones.
The relationships between speech genres
inside secondary genres are dialogic. What remains unclear,
are the borders between primary speech genres inside
secondary ones that are not actual borders between
utterances – there is no interchange of speakers. Bakhtin
mentions the so-called “border ‘scars’” inside the secondary
genres.[42] When a (more or less) primary speech genre
enters a secondary one the “dialogization of secondary
genres” occurs.[43] Another problem arises, because the
relations between speech genres remind us of syntactic
relations.
But in these phenomena the relations
between the primary genres that are reproduced cannot be
grammaticalised and retain their original nature within
the utterance that is categorically different from the
relations between words and sentences (and others
linguistic units […]), even thou they appear within the
borders if a single utterance.[44]
Similar to the above mentioned is the
distinction between grammatical pauses between linguistic
elements and real pauses between utterances and the
stylistic pauses between the utterances within a single
secondary utterance.
To study the questions we mentioned
above Bakhtin suggests stylistics, but not in its
traditional form. Stylistics should not explore the
individual style, which actually appears only within some
genres, for instance literary ones; in a military order it
is absent. For Bakhtin the style is fundamentally connected
to the speech genre. Aleksander Skaza comments that in the
text Discourse in the Novel Bakhtin emphasizes the
intentional aspect of the style that reflects a worldview -
this corresponds with current generic emphasis, because for
Bakhtin the genre is also a universal category, a possible
relation to reality that surrounds us.[45]
THE NOVEL
The theory of utterance and speech
genres is the foundation for Mikhail Bakhtin’s works on
literature. Since all the utterances in general are dialogic
the questions of the self-conscious dialogism arises. For
our purposes let’s note only two most important issues out
of an almost limitless field.
First, crucial for Bakhtin concerning
different literary phenomena are the relationships between
voices within literary genres as secondary utterances. This
leads us to the study of different types of novels where
there are always at least two voices, the voice of the
narrator and the hero’s voice. In his study Discourse in the
Novel (and other texts) Bakhtin defines the concept of “an
image” of language (or style or voice), which emphasizes
that the hero’s voice is not as autonomous as the authors,
it is only a more or less typical image of a voice. (Let us
recall that also an idea and a human consciousness consist
of the same substance – the ideology.) An image of hero is
therefore – because it is a part of a novel, i.e. a single
secondary utterance – always overcast by a more or less
intense “objective shadow”. If the authorial overshadowing
is very intense, the word of the other loses its individual
meaning and becomes a thing, a characteristic of a reified
hero. On the other extreme there is the weakening of the
objective shadow, which enables the hero’s own (more or
less) autonomous voice to dialogically interact with the
author. Let’s stress once again Bakhtin’s emphasis that at
least some overshadowing is unavoidable.
Secondly, what we’ve last said is (kind
of) not true for the so-called polyphonic novel that is
discussed in the two versions of the monograph on Dostoevsky
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art (1929) and Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1963). The main criteria defining
polyphony are the image of man and of his idea.[46]
The hero of polyphonic novel is a
subject and therefore (relatively) independent from the
author and authorial language. All his reality is his
relation to the world and to himself. The image of hero is
actually the meaning of the world and himself for himself.
Author creates multiple self-conscious entities – voices –
in their totalities. The world being represented in the
novel is not a function of the author’s voice but of the
hero’s self-consciousness. All characteristics of the hero
and the totality of his world are an element of his
subjectivism and an object of his reflexive thinking. The
hero is not stabile, autoidentical; he is not finished. It
is important only, what the world means for the hero and
not, what is he from the point of view of the world. If the
world is just a hero’s projection the world can never
causally determine the hero. All that the hero is faced with
are other consciousnesses with equal statuses, which include
the author’s consciousness. The event of coexistence and
dialogic interaction occurs outside real time and space. The
styles (as languages that the author uses) are not images
but functions in dialogue.[47] The novels of Dostoevsky are
endless dialogues between the author and heroes.
The hero’s self-consciousness as the
dominant element in the creation of his image is sufficient
to break down the monologism. It has to be emphasized that
the hero must not be the authorial “mouthpiece” – the
distance between the author and hero is essential; the
objectivation concerns his self-consciousness (but not the
hero himself as an object). The hero is pure voice,
unfinished and, accordingly, active in the dialogue. The
heroes are more or less aggressive “ideologists” struggling
for their usually monologic truths. The concept of the
coexisting voices belongs to the author, but at the same
time it is not a part of his own voice, i.e. ideology. This
could be partially explained with the fact that the
self-consciousness isn’t a hero’s characteristic in the same
way as his objective determinants. Contrarily to the
characteristics that determine and enclose him the
self-consciousness, on the other hand, opens the
possibilities of the hero as person, who is all in his
ideology, i.e. words. The author created the freedom of the
hero and his word so that the hero himself can develop his
own ideology with its own logic.
On the other side we have the image of
idea being the hero’s mode of existence. The idea on one
hand strengthens the hero’s self-consciousness and on the
other the self-consciousness enables the meaningful value of
an idea. Within the monological world there are no ideas,
there can be only characteristics. In a monologic horizon
the idea is always one, belonging to the author or to his
literary “mouthpiece” - the hero fused with the author.
Monologically the ideas are either affirmed or negated. In
the polyphonic novel the idea is “performed”. One explores
its possibilities. The author’s task is to bring all the
points of view in the novel to their extremities, to unfold
their inner persuasiveness and to confront them with one
another. (This is neither the relativistic position, where
there’s no need for dialogue – socially and historically
embedded ideas in their actuality do relate to the reality
of our life! -, nor it is the dogmatic position, in which
case the dialogue isn’t even possible.) The image of idea is
bound together with the image of man – one person is
confronted with multiple ideas and each idea lives only as
an event of two of multiple consciousnesses. There are no
isolated thoughts as elements of an abstract system.
The foundation of both, the image of
idea and the image of hero, is dialogic relationship. The
author’s relation to the hero should be as dialogised as
possible because otherwise the “monologically structured
blocks of life” appear in a novel – they appear in all
Dostoevsky’s novels (but don’t define them as a whole, of
course). The same can be said about the idea that gets its
full meaning only in the dialogic relation with other ideas
and particular contexts. Bakhtin stresses that the author
speaks with the hero in a kind of extemporal present. Also
the reader participates in this dialogue.
Before we divert our attention to these
problems, let us consider the dialogue in the polyphonic
novel (Dostoevsky’s novels and after). Bakhtin finds in the
analysis of the novel The Double a particular situation half
way between homophony and polyphony – a single consciousness
is divided into three voices. In the novel Notes from
Underground we find the polyphony for the first time. The
hero’s word confronts other voices while trying to protect
his own openness, subjectivity. (We have already mentioned
“the word with a loophole” as “a way out” for the
consciousness.)
Dialogue in the novels does not describe
the heroes and their relationships. On the contrary, in the
external dialogue, which is a part of composition, we can
distinguish two closely connected layers: the inner
microdialogue within the consciousness of hero is split into
multiple voices and as such it is the substance for the
external dialogue. Some heroes relate to one group of voices
other to the other group. For instance, Ivan Karamazov wants
and at the same time doesn’t want to kill his father;
Smerdyakov hears one group of voices, Alyosha is more
focused on the other group. In this situation the other in
the dialogue (and the dialogue itself) exits his position in
the plot (exits authorial unity of the novel) into “the
abstract sphere of the pure relationship between human
beings”.[48] Polyglossia is in this case an extra-temporal
and extra-spatial event in the carnivalesque space.[49] (And
therefore isn’t an autoidentic situation firmly placed in a
pre-existent world.)
The polyphonic novel realizes all the
possibilities of the dialogic understanding of the world.
These novels are word (literature, understanding) about word
(human and his consciousness as ideology) confronting word
(the consciousness of the other). What is important is the
struggle against the reification of a human being.[50]
According to Bakhtin the polyphony is a new way of artistic
thinking that transcends the novel. It is the only way to
grasp the dialogic existence of human consciousness in its
freedom. All that is left of the so-called reality – in the
horizon of polyphony – is the multiplicity of
consciousnesses and their worlds (in dialogue).
The dialogism therefore makes possible a
curious procedure: objectification or the other as a
subject, or, we could say, his subjectivation. The troubles
with the terminology suggest complications.
DIALOGISM AND EXTRA-LOCATION
The problem isn’t just a false
interpretation of Dostoevsky’s novels. The novel, according
to Bakhtin’s theory is a secondary genre, a single utterance
with a single author and his final meaning. The theory of
polyphony therefore analyses the inner scars within an
utterance between the utterances (or their parts) that
entered it. Bakhtin enabled us to distinguish the relations
within utterances that are not linguistic (logic), but
dialogic. To understand the concept of voice of the other it
requires Bakhtin’s metalinguistics, the theory of the
(polyphonic) novel, which enables us to see the real
burgeoning of voices.
The most important objections to
Bakhtin’s polyphony emphasize his rejection of the
difference between fiction and life. It is hard to imagine
the author to speak to his heroes that are completely
autonomous. What he’s looking for is the ideal voice that
would be freed from its objective shadow. This is, of
course, impossible, Bakhtin adds. The word of the other is
necessarily to some extent objectified. Anyway, it is
important to make this objectification as slight as
possible. We are confronted with the ethical-hermeneutical
task to let the voice of the other remain other and free. It
should not become an object or enter the immanence of the I.
Let us quote the position of Aleksander Skaza.
[…] Bakhtin restrains the influence
of purely communicative (only informative) aspects of
the language and doesn’t allow the changing of the
personal meaning (the voice) into a thing, a mere
message (it is the main idea of his theory of polyphonic
novel and the philosophy of the language as a whole)
[…][51]
We shall see, that the key question
about these problems is the question concerning dialogic
relationship.
We have already mentioned the theory of
the utterance and metalinguistics as the theory of speech
genres. What remains unclear is the dialogical relationship.
Dialogism is a fundamental relation in Bakhtin’s, we could
say, metaphysics – even a human is no more nor less than a
series of utterances in speech communication. In this part
of the essay we’ll show that in the very core of dialogism
there is a mystical attempt of thinking something that
transcends subject–object relations.
Bakhtin’s dialogue is not a dialogue of
two existing consciousnesses in real world attempting to
understand each other. In this case we presuppose an
objectively existing world, not only existing but also
potentially explained. The truth about me and the other is a
given. For these two truths to be objective, with Bakhtin’s
words “consummated”[52] (e.g. finished), one requires a
transcending consciousness. We of course could speak about
transcendence in Bakhtin, but it could not be grasped in
such vulgar technical terms. Let’s try something else. There
are two consciousnesses in the dialogue, but these are two
categorically different entities: I and the other (as you).
Between them there is a particular relation - that is the
fundament for the concept of dialogism – called
extra-location or exotopy or extopy or simply position
outside[53]. We are confronted with a problem how to think
oneself and the other within the limits of a consciousness
(as semiotic or ideology), outside of which nothing is
accessible. In Bakhtin’s case the emphasis is on literature
and the relation between the author and hero, which suggests
us to consider his first major study[54] Author and Hero in
Aesthetic Activity.[55]
The extra-location of the author as I in
relation to the other – hero – is the very essence of the
dialogic relation being always relationship to the other
that is a subject and not my intentional object. The early
notion of extra-location was connected with the concept of
dialogism in Bakhtin’s late essays[56], but the
extra-location itself is the most elaborated in the early
works, particularly the phenomenological study Author and
Hero in Aesthetic Activity that we mentioned. (The notion of
dialogue is still absent.) In this text Bakhtin uses the
phenomenological description to show the differences between
human self-experience – I-for-myself – and his experience of
the other. It is a complex analysis - we’ll illuminate it
from a particular point of view.
The extra-location of the I, and his
transgredience (being outside of the other) that derives
from it, is evident for Bakhtin, a result of intuition. He
elaborates it on three levels: space, time and meaning.
Space first. I myself cannot experience my outward image,
the outward boundaries of the body. That is to say, my
appearance, beauty or ugliness for instance. To imagine
myself as a consummated whole in the world as “environment”
I need another consciousness. I experience myself from
inside and the world around me is ever expanding “horizon”,
which is not clearly detached from my body. It is not the
case that I could not discursively think myself as a part of
the outside world, the important thing is that I can not
axiologically approach myself with emotional-volitional
reaction, that is to say, I can not experience my true self.
All my emotional reactions are appropriations of other
people’s emotional reactions. (One can see the inadequacy of
self-experience in his experience of others.) It is similar
with time. As in space I also transgress my boundaries in
time. In a form of “spirit” I am detached from time and a
part of a meaning-governed sequence that could never be
consummated. There is nothing “given” in I, everything is
“still to be achieved” (in responsible task and possibility
of the personality). Only the other can experience myself in
time “rhythm” as “soul”, the “inner life” delimited in
temporal and spatial environment. For instance, I can not
experience myself in time because I am always with me and at
the same time I can not experience my birth nor death. I as
a “spirit” do not coincide with me myself, which is for the
other a feature of a “given” delimited “soul”. The third
level - the meaning - is one of consummation of the hero as
an axiological position in the event of being – how to
delimit and consummate him.
Neither I nor other can be reduced, but
the importance of either of them varies in particular
“events”.[57] The cognitive event (treatise, article,
lecture) reduces the other consciousness, the hero. What is
left is the author with his objects. In the ethical event
the author and hero coincide while standing in the face of a
value that they agree or disagree upon (polemical tract,
manifesto etc.). The aesthetic event is different. There are
two non-coinciding consciousnesses. The aesthetic event
consists of two phases: first I as the author actively
abandon my extra-location and enter the other – this is the
case of the ethical event of standing (together with the
other) in a meaning-governed sequence, a part of an act that
transgresses its boundaries. But the aesthetic event
requires the reestablishment of transgredient position of
“the excess of seeing and knowing”. (We’ll return to the
religious event later on.)
Let’s consider the relations between
ethical, aesthetic and cognitive event. There are
similarities with later theories of Emmanuel Lévinas
especially his early work Time and the Other[58]. (The
scholars don’t speak of influence.) Also for Lévinas the
immanence could not be overcome by cognitive means, the
science is for both authors inside the I. For Lévinas the
transgression of immanence is possible through ethics, but
it seems that in Time and the Other the ethics is closer to
hermeneutics than in his later more purely ethical texts. It
is interesting that authors demonstrate the self-overcoming
of the I in love, also in the form of sexuality, when the
relation tends to fuse I and the other but nevertheless they
remain apart. Bakhtin writes: “[…] the sexual features […]
cloud the aesthetic purity of these […] actions”.[59] »In
the sexual approach, the other’s outer body disintegrates
and becomes merely a constituent of my own inner body […]”
Therefore the other is reduced and fused in the immanence of
the I, but nevertheless: “To be sure, this merging into one
inner flesh is an ultimate limit toward which my sexual
attitude tends in its purest form.”[60] On the contrary, the
essence of aesthetic activity, the author’s extra-location,
is love as ethical (in Lévinas’ terminology) relationship
with the other. It is important that both authors
distinguish eroticism as immanence from its more adequate
interpretation as ethical relation to the other. We have
also seen that Lévinas’ ethics is actually Bakhtin
aesthetics. (We shall avoid the problems concerning the term
aesthetics.)
Bakhtin’s aesthetically creative
relationship is “aesthetic love”, “transgredient gift” that
is otherwise inaccessible. The author’s extra-location has
to be “intensive” and “loving”, it should not interfere with
other person’s freedom. The understanding is always a part
of immanence, but love “brings forth an aesthetic form for
the co-experienced life that is transgradient to that
life”.[61] Its consummated image, a “given” – being the
opposite of existentially intentional “still to be achieved”
– must not annihilate the other in his unconsummated I. The
fusion of the I and the other would only increase the
hopelessness of immanence, the other has to stay outside to
preserve what is inaccessible from the point of view of the
I.
Only on aesthetic level one finds a true
ethical dimension of I and the other. The author consummates
the other, but on the other hand, this process is the very
foundation of the author as I himself that transgresses his
boundaries. (This is a signal of the crisis of
extra-location, which we’ll demonstrate together with the
religious event.) The principle of non-finalizability is a
feature or I that the other could grasp only through ethics.
In both cases, Lévinas’ and Bakhtin’s, we see that ethics
(Bakhtin’s aesthetics) is actually a hermeneutic principle
that guides the lonely I out of his immanence. If the
author’s extra-location is impaired, the hero is reified;
the event is reduced from aesthetic (ethic) to cognitive
level of immanence (later called monological). Hermeneutic
feature of ethics is especially emphasized in Bakhtin’s late
essays, for instance Toward a Methodology for the Human
Sciences. In Lévinas the hermeneutics is hidden behind
ethics, but we are nevertheless confronted with the
mysterious, the other, the self-transgressing through ethics
- with philosophical glance towards absolute other.
Bakhtin and Lévinas speak of
transcendental, often in the form of God. Lévinas’ ethical
relationship with another human is a way towards infinite,
mysterious, absolute other. Bakhtin in later works speaks of
the third party in the dialogue, the one that understands it
as a general possibility of dialogue. When we had been
speaking of cognitive, ethical and aesthetic event we left
out the religious one. It is a relationship between I and
the other consciousness that is “the encompassing
consciousness of God”.[62] Godly extra-location toward
myself is absolute. God’s pure gift, unmerited one,
forgiveness and redemption are ideal schemes of the
extra-location.
[…] trust in God is an immanent
constitutive moment of pure self-consciousness and
self-expression. (Where I overcome in myself the
axiological self-contentment of present-on-hand being, I
overcome precisely that which concealed God, and where I
absolutely do not coincide with myself, a place for God
is opened up.)[63]
In my non-coinciding with myself there
is a place for God, it’s hidden in an endless dialogue,
let’s recall, Bakhtin’s fundamental concept. In the pure
religious event the other (God) is principally
non-guaranteed.
[…] this moment of otherness is
axiologically transcendent to self-consciousness and is
in principal not guaranteed, for a guarantee would
reduce it to the level of present-on-hand being (at
best, aestheticized being, as in metaphysics). One can
live and gain consciousness of oneself neither under a
guarantee nor in a void (an axiological guarantee and an
axiological void), but only in faith.[64]
Bakhtin mentions “religious naiveté”
where I become “from an I-for myself into the other for
God”, that has to be, as we have quoted, not guaranteed. I
must not be passive for the transgredient other, who is not
guaranteed. Bakhtin’s radical position is trying to maintain
the openness of an event (that becomes later a part of the
great dialogue).
Bakhtin has written about God on many
occasions, but none of them was published during his life
(except in the special context in the book on Dostoevsky).
One has found a fragment Towards the Philosophical Bases of
the Human Sciences (1940-43)[65] that was later developed
into Bakhtin’s last text Toward a Methodology for the Human
Sciences. In this fragment we find a dichotomy between the
reification process in the practical interest and the other
extreme: “[…] thought of God in the presence of God, a
dialogue, petition, prayer. Necessity of free self-exposure
of the personality.” Here we finally find the concept of
dialogue that implicates two consciousnesses that are
radically non-fused. Their relationship tends to affirm the
other as the absolute other. The dialogue is founded in the
extra-location if the I toward the other, and is an ethical
and hermeneutic feature. Bakhtin’s thought is through the
absoluteness of the other therefore close to the mystical
tradition, which we could illustrate with Nicolaus von Kues
dialogue De Deo Abscondito.[66] In the core of mysticism
there is a thought that opens up to the transcendental which
could never be adequately described or named. All what is
left are cognitive attempts to grasp the transcendental,
which not being accessible to logic opens up through play,
imagery, symbols, and particularly in Bakhtin’s case through
dialogue as an ethical and hermeneutic task driven to the
pitch of religious experience.[67]
From what we have said till now it
remains unclear how come Bakhtin foregrounds “the character”
as the most interesting form of the aesthetic relationship
between the author and the hero. The character is a part of
epic, i.e. monologic world. This is unusual since we would
expect, according to the radicality of the dialogic position
(and the extra-location in its core), that it is the image
of the hero from the polyphonic novel that who is the most
eminent. Bakhtin actually mentions the limits of the epic
hero and his (monologic) “dogmatism”.
Author and hero still belong to one
and the same world, in which the value of one’s kin or
kind is still dominant (in its various forms: nation,
tradition, etc.). It is in this constitutive moment that
the author’s position of being outside the hero finds
its limitation: it does not extend to the point of being
outside the bounds of the hero’s world view and sense of
the world. Author and hero have nothing to dispute
about, although, on the other hand, the author’s
position outside the hero is particularly firm and
stable in this case (disputes render it unstable).[68]
The character as the firmest form of
extra-location has its limits, which suggests problems in
the concept of extra-location itself. It, on one hand,
enables the objectification of the other as a thing in the
world, but on the other, the non-finalizability of the
consciousness demands the openness also in its aesthetic
image. The extra-location is therefore two-fold: its ethical
dimension, giving the other his radical freedom, confronts
the cognitive attempt to consummate the other.
The human consciousness as ideology
steps into the centre of Bakhtin’s studies in his works from
the second half of the twenties. If the consciousness is
heteronomous, external to man, the foundations for
extra-location start to disintegrate. Bakhtin finds “the
crisis of extra-location”[69] in the works of Dostoevsky, as
the authorial position loses its authority (because it is
not absolutely external). (The other two expressions of the
crisis of extra-location and the Classical character are
sentimentality, when the works become tendentious, and the
strengthening of the cognitive component, when the realistic
novel becomes a mere illustration of a social theory.)
Nevertheless the continuity between Bakhtin’s early works
and the philosophy of language remains – the necessity of
the other to axiologically approach my own self, that is
based on the phenomenological description of the two modes
of existence (I and the other), is the foundation of the
heteronomous concept of consciousness as ideology. The
philosophy of language was derived from the theory of
axiological extra-location of the other in time, space and
intentional position in an event (meaning).
Here we return to the polyphonic novel.
In the crisis of extra-location the author is confronted
with a difficult task, how to create an image of hero and at
the same time not turning the other consciousness into a
dead object. This situation remains a problem. The most
important thing is that the author lets the other
consciousness enough space to develop its possibilities, but
the absolute tolerance is of course categorically
impossible, because the image of voice is a part of a single
utterance belonging to a single author. The word of the
other is always a part of an image of idea and its carrier,
i.e. the ideologist. On the other hand, it is impossible for
the author to become an image among others. He inhabits the
grand dialogue of life that can be transposed into
literature only in a mediated form, overcast by an objective
shadow. (In the study Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity
– differently than in the later works - the overshadowing
relates to the Godly mercy, protection … the transgredient
gift of the other.)[70] It is possible for different images
of languages to enter a novel (or be understood in general,
because the dialogism isn’t a particularly literary feature
but a universal one) but these languages can never reach the
same level with the author (or the subject trying to
understand in general). The polyphony as an attitude remains
on a border between polemical position and non-transgredient
consummation – because the real transgredience belongs to
God. The polyphony therefore represents an ideal scheme that
is in principle out of reach. What is left is dialogic
relationship towards the other - the key to it is ethics
(according to Lévinas) or in Bakhtin’s words radicalization
of the aesthetic relation to the limits of religious
experience.
REFERENCES
-
Arendt, Hannah: Kaj je filozofija
eksistence? Društvo Apokalipsa, Ljubljana, 1998.
-
Bakhtin, M. M.: Art and
Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays. Ed. Michael
Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. Trans. and notes by Vadim
Liapunov. Supplement trans. by Kenneth Brostrom.
University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990.
-
Bakhtin, Mikhail: Contemporary
vitalism. Trans. Charles Byrd. In: Burwick, Fredrick &
Douglass, Paul (ed.): The crisis in modernism: Bergson
and the vitalist controversy. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 11992; p. 76-97.
-
Bakhtin, M. M.: The Dialogic
Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans.
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. University of Texas
Press, Austin, 1981.
-
Bakhtin, Mikhail / Vološinov, V. N.:
Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art (Concerning
Sociological Poetics). In: Davis, Robert Con &
Schleifer, Ronald ed.: Contemporary Literary Criticism:
Literary and Cultural Studies. Longman, New York,
London, 1989; p. 391-410.
-
Bahtin, Mihail M.: Estetika in
humanistične vede. SH – Zavod za založniško dejavnost,
Ljubljana 1999. (Partially corresponds with Speech
Genres and Other Late Essays and Art and Answerability.)
-
Baxtin, M. M.: The Forms of Time and
the Chronopopos in the Novel: From Greek Novel to Modern
Fiction. Trans. by Wendy Rosslyn. In: PTL: A Journal for
Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature, Vol. 3,
No. 3, October 1978, p. 493-528. (This is an abbreviated
version ob the text.)
-
Bahtin, Mihail (Vološinov, V. N.):
Marksizam i filozofija jezika. Nolit, Beograd, 1980.
-
Bahtin, Mihail: Problemi poetike
Dostojevskog. Nolit, Beograd, 1967.
-
Bakhtin, M. M.: Speech Genres and
Other Late Essays. Trans. Vern W. McGee. Ed. Caryl
Emerson and Michael Holquist. University of Texas Press,
Austin, 1986.
-
Bahtin, Mihail: Stvaralaštvo Fransoa
Rablea i narodna kultura srednjega veka i renesanse.
Nolit, Beograd, 1973.
-
Bahtin, Mihail: Teorija romana:
Izbrane razprave. Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana, 1982.
(Corresponds with The Dialogic Imagination.)
-
Bakhtin, M. M.: Toward a Philosophy
of the Act. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Ed. Vadim Liapunov
and Michael Holquist. University of Texas Press, Austin,
1993.
-
Bakhtin, Mikhail: The word in the
novel. Trans. By Ann Shukman. In: Shaffer, E. S. (ed.):
Comparative criticism: A yearbook. Vol. 2. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge …, 11980; p. 213-20. (This
is an abbreviated version ob the text.)
-
Dolinar, Darko: Dialoškost in
hermenevtika: Gadamer, Jauß, Bahtin. In: Primerjalna
književnost, 19 (1996), 2, 49-58. Or in German: Javornik
… et al. (ed.): Bakhtin and the Humanities, p. 161-72.
-
Eliade, Mircea: Kozmos in zgodovina:
Mit o večnem vračanju. Nova Revija, Lj., 1992.
-
Emerson, Caryl: Bakhtin, Mikhail
Mikhailovich. In: Makaryk.
-
Javornik, Miha … et al. (ed.):
Bakhtin and the Humanities: Proceedings of the
International Conference in Ljubljana, October 19-21,
1995 / Bahtin in humanistične vede: Zbornik prispevkov z
mednarodnega simpozija v Ljubljani, 19. - 21. oktobra
1995. Znanstveni inštitut Filozofske fakultete,
Ljubljana, 1997.
-
Javornik, Miha: Nesklenjenost
Bahtinove misli kot njena odlika: Kaj je sploh dialog?.
In: Bahtin, Mihail M.: Estetika in humanistične vede, p.
383-98.
-
Juvan, Marko: Domači Parnas v
narekovajih: Parodija in slovenska književnost.
Literarno-umetniško društvo Literatura, Ljubljana, 1997.
-
Juvan, Marko: Introduction. In:
Javornik … et al. (ed.): Bakhtin and the Humanities, p.
5-25.
-
Juvan, Marko: The parody and
Bakhtin. In: Javornik … et al. (ed.): Bakhtin and the
Humanities, p. 193-212.
-
Kos, Janko: Uvod v metodologijo
literarne vede. In: Primerjalna književnost, 11 (1988),
1, p. 1-17.
-
Kuzanski, Nikolaj: Razgovor med
kristjanom in poganom o skritem Bogu. In: Gorazd
Kocijančič: Posredovanja. Mohorjeva družba, Celje, 1996.
-
Lévinas, Emmanuel: Etika in
neskončno; Čas in drugi. Družina, Ljubljana, 1998.
-
Makaryk, Irena Rima (ur.):
Encyclopedia of contemporary literary theory:
Approaches, Scholars, Terms. University of Toronto
Press, Toronto …, 1993.
-
Matijašević, Radovan: Bahtinova
teorija govora. In: Bahtin, Mihail (Vološinov, V. N.):
Marksizam i filozofija jezika, p. IX-XL.
-
Milošević, Nikola: Bahtinovo
tumačenje Dostojevskog. In: Bahtin, Mihail: Problemi
poetike Dostojevskog, p. 9-49.
-
Shukman, Ann: Between Marxism and
Formalism: the stylistics of Mikhail Bakhtin. In:
Shaffer, E. S. (ed.): Comparative criticism: A yearbook.
Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge …, 11980;
p. 221-34.
-
Skaza, Aleksander: Estetski
humanizem Mihaila Bahtina: Spremna beseda. In: Bahtin,
Mihail M.: Estetika in humanistične vede, 355-82.
-
Skaza, Aleksander: Mihail Mihajlovič
Bahtin: Oris življenja in dela. In: Bahtin, Mihail:
Teorija romana, 384-424.
-
Solovjov, Vladimir Sergejevič:
Duhovne osnove življenja. Ljubljana: Društvo SKAM, 2000.
-
Škulj, Jola: Dialogism as a
non-finalized concept of truth: The twentieth century
literature and its logic of inconclusiveness. In:
Javornik … et al. (ed.): Bakhtin and the Humanities, p.
139-50.
-
Škulj, Jola: Poststrukturalizem in
Bahtinov pojem dialogizma. In: Primerjalna književnost,
16 (1993), 1, p. 16-27.
-
Vaupotič, Aleš: Hard Times Charlesa
Dickensa in Mihail Bahtin.
www.geocities.com/kino_log/HTCDiMB.htm
-
Vaupotič, Aleš: Novi historizem,
Michel Foucault in Mihail Bahtin.
www.geocities.com/kino_log/novihistorizem.htm
-
Verč, Ivan: Izjava kot vprašanje
kulturne evolucije. In: Primerjalna književnost, 19
(1996), 2, 29-36. Or in Russian: Javornik … et al.
(ed.): Bakhtin and the Humanities, p. 117-24.
[1] This text is a part of a larger
study (in Slovene). See Hard Times Charlesa Dickensa in
Mihail Bahtin
www.geocities.com/kino_log/HTCDiMB.htm (an
interpretation of Charles Dickens' novel Hard Times) and
Novi historizem, Michel Foucault in Mihail Bahtin
www.geocities.com/kino_log/novihistorizem.htm (a
methodological study on the new historicism, Michel Foucault
and Mikhail Bakhtin).
[2] See Kos: Uvod v metodologijo
literarne vede.
[3] We do not use this word in the
meaning »to be subjected to«.
[4] See Skaza: Mihail Mihajlovič Bahtin,
391. Škulj tries to find differences in her essay
Poststrukturalizem in Bahtinov pojem dialogizma (23-4).
[5] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences in: Estetika
in humanistične vede (E. i. h. v.), 308. We have used
official English translations, if they were available.
Otherwise we have verified the technical terms in different
English studies on Bakhtin.
[6] Marksizam i filozofija jezika (M. i
f. j.), 45.
[7] Same, 30.
[8] Same, 10-1.
[9] See A. A. H.-L: Der Rusische
Formalismus: Metodologische Rekonstruktion seiner
Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip der Verfremdung. Wien, 1978, p.
182-3. In Skaza: Mihail Mihajlovič Bahtin, 421-2.
[10] M. i f. j., 14.
[11] The Problem of Speech Genres in: E.
i. h. v., 275.
[12] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences in: E. i. h.
v., 292.
[13] E. i. h. v., 306.
[14] Same, 289.
[15] M. i f. j., 115. Emphasis is
Bakhtin’s.
[16] M. i f. j., Matjaševič, XXXV.
[17] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences and Skaza in:
E. i. h. v., 301. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.
[18] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences, second
chapter.
[19] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences, first
chapter.
[20] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences.
[21] The Problem of Speech Genres in: E.
i. h. v.
[22] Same, 243.
[23] Toward a Methodology for the Human
Sciences in: E. i. h. v., 339. Teorija romana (T. r.), 112.
[24] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences in: E. i. h.
v., 313.
[25] Same, 305.
[26] Same, 316.
[27] Same, 318.
[28] Same, 319.
[29] Problemi poetike Dostojevskog (P.
p. D.), 311.
[30] E. i. h. v., 52.
[31] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences in: E. i. h.
v., 319.
[32] Toward a Methodology for the Human
Sciences in Makaryk, 32.
[33] The Problem of the Text in
Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences in: E. i. h.
v., 317.
[34] Matjašević, XXXVIII.
[35] Same, XXXV.
[36] Same.
[37] E. i. h. v., 301.
[38] See Vaupotič: Novi historizem,
Michel Foucault in Mihail Bahtin
www.geocities.com/kino_log/novihistorizem.htm.
[39] Matjašević, XXXI.
[40] The Problem of Speech Genres in: E.
i. h. v.
[41] Same, 240-1.
[42] Same, 250 (also 310).
[43] Same, 241.
[44] Same, 250-1.
[45] The Problem of Speech Genres in E.
i. h. v. 239.
[46] Chapters 2 and 3 in Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics.
[47] E. i. h. v., 298.
[48] P. p. D., 351.
[49] Same.
[50] Same, 120.
[51] Skaza’s notes in: E. i. h. v., 303.
[52] See Bakhtin: Art and Answerability
(A. a. A.).
[53] Russian: vnenahodimost, Slovene:
zunajbivanje. Also see Goranka Lozanović in: Javornik:
Bakhtin and the Humanities.
[54] 1920-24, published posthumously.
[55] In: A. a. A. See also Skaza:
Estetski humanizem Mihaila Bahtina.
[56] In: Response to a Question from the
Novyi mir Editorial Staff (1970) and Toward a Methodology
for the Human Sciences (1974).
[57] See particularly A. a. A., 22.
[58] Lectures 1946-47.
[59] A. a. A., 42.
[60] Same, 51.
[61] Same, 86.
[62] Same, 22.
[63] Same, 144.
[64] Same.
[65] E. i. H. v., 352-3.
[66] Kuzanski, 28-9.
[67] On religious in Bakhtin see Skaza:
Estetski humanizem Mihaila Bahtina, Chapter 4.
[68] A. a. A., 179.
[69] A. a. A., 202. E. i. H. v., 304
(Skaza’s note).
[70] A. a. A., 41, 66-7.
|